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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 The state appeals from the district court’s intermediate appellate decision reversing 
the magistrate’s denial of Aaron Eugene Lantis’s motion for acquittal. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Lantis with one count of disturbing the peace of H.H. “by 
offensive and/or threatening conduct, by sending sexually suggestive pictures of [H.H.] to 
her employer(s).”  (R., pp. 8-9.)  The charge was amended to disturbing the peace “by 
offensive conduct by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to [H.H.]’s employer.”  
(R., pp. 28-29.)  The matter proceeded to trial, where a jury found Lantis guilty.  (R., pp. 
42, 44-49.) 
 Lantis filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, contending that the state presented 
insufficient evidence of an act falling within the scope of the disturbing the peace statute.  
(R., pp. 76-88.)  The state responded that the evidence showed that Lantis maliciously sent 
sexually compromising photographs of H.H. to her employers in an effort to get her fired, 
which disturbed H.H.’s peace.  (R., pp. 107-17.)  The magistrate denied the motion.  (R., 
p. 126.)   
 The magistrate entered judgment and Lantis appealed to the district court.  (R., pp. 
127, 136-37.)  The district court reversed, concluding that Lantis’s conduct, “however 
reprehensible it is, does not constitute a violation of the statute.”  (R., pp. 219-27.)  The 







 Did the district court err on appeal from the magistrate division by concluding that 
Lantis’s action of sending compromising pictures of H.H. to H.H.’s employer in an effort 
to humiliate her and get her terminated from employment did not constitute disturbing the 








The District Court Erred By Concluding That Lantis’s Actions Did Not Constitute 




 As stated by the district court, the evidence showed that Lantis and H.H. were in a 
romantic relationship.  (R., p. 222.)  During the course of that relationship H.H. sent Lantis 
“‘sexually provocative’ photographs she had taken of herself.”  (R., pp. 222-23.)  “After 
their relationship ended, the appellant emailed four of these photos to the victim’s 
workplace, including to her supervisor and members of the company’s board of directors, 
in an unsuccessful effort to have her fired from her job. The victim testified that the 
appellant’s conduct ‘humiliated’ and ‘annoyed’ her.”  (R., p. 223 (citations omitted).) 
 The district court concluded that the disturbing the peace statute prohibits only 
conduct that disturbs “the exterior or sensory peace of a neighborhood, family, or person,” 
and does not “prohibit offending someone’s internal sensibilities.”  (R., p. 223 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).)  It vacated Lantis’s conviction and ordered dismissal of the 
charge.  (R., p. 226.) 
 In making its ruling, the district court did not analyze the plain language of the 
statute.  (R., pp. 219-26.)  In failing to do so, it erred.  Moreover, application of the correct 
legal standards of statutory interpretation leads to the opposite result. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “We exercise free review over statutory interpretation because it is a question of 
law.”  State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3, 343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015).  On review of a decision 
rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate capacity, the reviewing court 
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“directly review[s] the district court’s decision to determine whether it correctly decided 
the issues presented to it on appeal.”  Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d 102, 
107 (2010); see also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008). 
 
C. The District Court Erroneously Failed To Consider The Plain Language Of The 
Disturbing The Peace Statute 
 
Statutory interpretation “must begin with the literal words of the statute; those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole.  If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but 
simply follows the law as written.”  Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 
889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 
P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (citations omitted)).  This Court has “consistently held that where 
statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should 
not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.” 
Id. (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 
(1993)).  Moreover, per Verska, this plain meaning controls even if this Court concludes it 
is patently absurd or would produce absurd results if construed as written.  151 Idaho at 
896, 265 P.3d at 509.  Finally, a “statute is not ambiguous merely because the parties 
present differing interpretations.”  BHC Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada Cty., 150 Idaho 
93, 96, 244 P.3d 237, 240 (2010). 
The disturbing the peace statute provides:  
Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of 
any neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by 
tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling, 
challenging to fight or fighting, or fires any gun or pistol, or uses any vulgar, 
profane or indecent language within the presence or hearing of children, in 




I.C. § 18-6409(1).  Because much of the language is disjunctive, the portion of the statute 
relevant to this appeal reads: “Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the 
peace … of any … person, by … offensive conduct … is guilty of a misdemeanor.”  I.C. 
§ 18-6409(1).  The plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the word “peace” includes 
“freedom from disquieting or oppressive thoughts or emotions” and “harmony in personal 
relations.” (Merriam-Webster online dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/peace, last visited 12/6/18.)  “Offensive” includes “giving painful 
or unpleasant sensations” or “causing displeasure or resentment.”  (Merriam-Webster 
online dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/offensive, last visited 
12/6/18.)  Thus, every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs another’s freedom 
from oppressive thoughts or emotions or harmony in personal relations, by conduct 
intended to cause unpleasant or painful sensations, displeasure or resentment, is guilty of 
disturbing the peace.  The plain language of the statute does not limit disturbing the peace 
to “the exterior or sensory peace” of a person (R., p. 223), and the district court erred by 
engrafting such a limitation. 
 The district court concluded that grafting an “exterior or sensory” limitation to the 
language of the statute was called for by “the related terms of the statute requiring that the 
disturbing the peace conduct include loud or unusual noise, gun fire, challenging someone 
to a fight, loudness or boisterousness, or tumultuous conduct.”  (R., p. 223.)  It also looked 
to the section’s placement in the overall Idaho Code.  (R., pp. 223-24.)  This analysis is 
inconsistent with the standard that gives words their ordinary meaning.  Because the district 
court employed standards of statutory construction instead of the plain meaning of the 
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words of the statute, it erred.  This Court should employ the plain meaning of the words of 
the statute and reverse.  
Even if the district court were correct to resort to rules of statutory interpretation, 
rather than the plain meaning of the words the legislature used, its analysis does not support 
its conclusion.  First, the context of the words in the statute does not limit their meaning to 
“external” peace as opposed to “internal” peace.  The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted 
the disturbing the peace statute as follows: 
A violation of the statute can be committed as follows: 
 
Every person who maliciously and wilfully [1] disturbs the peace or quiet 
of any neighborhood, family or person, [a] by loud or unusual noise, or [b] 
by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or [c] by threatening, traducing, 
quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting, or [2] fires any gun or pistol, or 
[3] uses any vulgar, profane or indecent language within the presence or 
hearing of children, in a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
 
State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 894, 88 P.3d 704, 713 (2004).  The district court correctly 
concluded that some language in this statute could only apply to disturbing “the exterior or 
sensory peace” of a person (R., p. 223), but clearly not all of it.   
First, the relevant subsection is to disturb the “peace or quiet” of a person.  I.C. 
§ 18-6409(1) (emphasis added).  Thus, “peace” and “quiet” must be given independent 
meanings.  State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007) (“In 
determining its ordinary meaning effect must be given to all the words of the statute if 
possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant.” (internal quotations 
omitted).)   
More importantly, committing the crime by “threatening” or “traducing” are 
specifically aimed at the person’s “‘internal’ sensibilities.”  (R., p. 223.)  It is completely 
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incongruous to say that Lantis could have committed the crime by making false claims 
about H.H.’s sexuality to her employer in an effort to get her fired (traducing) but cannot 
commit the crime by sending sexually explicit photographs of her to her employer in an 
effort to get her fired.  The district court erred by inserting a requirement that disturbing 
the peace of a person can only be accomplished by disturbing the “exterior or sensory” 
peace of a person which is not in the plain language of the statute.    
 Equally misplaced is the district court’s analysis with the disturbing the peace 
statue’s placement in the same chapter as statutes on riot, rout, unlawful assembly, and 
prize fighting.  (R., p. 223.)  Because the plain meaning includes disturbances by causing 
oppressive thoughts and emotions or harm to relationships, this form of statutory 
interpretation should not have been considered.  
Even if considering the chapter placement were proper, it does little, if anything, to 
assist in discerning legislative intent.  Simply stated, the other definitions of crimes in the 
chapter do no limit disturbing the peace to disturbances of “exterior” peace.  “Riot” is 
defined as: 
Any action, use of force or violence, or threat thereof, disturbing the public 
peace, or any threat to use such force or violence, if accompanied by 
immediate power of execution, by two (2) or more persons acting together, 
and without authority of law, which results in: 
(a)  physical injury to any person; or 
(b)  damage or destruction to public or private property; or 
(c)  a disturbance of the public peace …. 
 
I.C. § 18-6401.  “Unlawful assembly” is two or more people gathered “to do an unlawful 
act” (but not accomplishing the act) or gathered to “do a lawful act in a violent, boisterous 
or tumultuous manner.”  I.C. § 18-6404.  “Assembly to disturb peace” is two or more 
persons assembled “for the purpose of disturbing the public peace, or committing any 
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unlawful act,” who do not disburse when told to.  I.C. § 18-6410.  There is no crime of 
“rout” or “prize fighting” currently in the chapter.  Although the crime of “riot” cannot be 
committed without a breach of the “exterior or sensory” peace, neither an unlawful 
assembly “to do an unlawful act” nor a refusal to disburse an assembly created to commit 
“any unlawful act” involves any breach of the “exterior or sensory” peace of a person.  Not 
only is the district court’s distinction between “exterior” and “internal” peace not found in 
the statute, it is not found in the chapter. 
 Finally, the district court relied on State v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661, 365 P.3d 417 (Ct. 
App. 2016), for the proposition that “[t]he Idaho Court of Appeals held that the state failed 
to present evidence supporting a conviction for disturbing the peace for conduct that was 
clearly offensive but outside the statutory definition of disturbing the peace.”  (R., pp. 224-
25.)  This logic is circular.  The state has never argued that all offensive conduct constitutes 
disturbing the peace. 
 A closer reading of Pierce shows no support for the district court’s analysis.  Pierce 
was convicted of violating a protection order.   Pierce, 159 Idaho at 662, 365 P.3d at 418.  
The order stated that Pierce was not to “disturb the peace” of his ex-wife and her minor 
children.  Id.  Pierce terminated electrical power service to the house, which he owned and 
in which the ex-wife lived.  Id.  The jury convicted and the district court vacated the 
judgment “on the grounds that the state failed to provide evidence at trial that Pierce’s 
termination of the electrical service constituted disturbing the peace,” using I.C. § 18-
6409(1) as the definition of disturbing the peace.  Id. The state argued “the district court 
erred in vacating Pierce’s judgment of conviction because the state was not required to 
prove elements of a crime it did not charge.”  Id. at 663, 365 P.3d at 419.  The state did not 
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argue that that the evidence showed a violation of I.C. § 18-6409(1).  Id.  “The issue on 
appeal is whether the district court erred in interpreting the phrase ‘disturb the peace,’ from 
the protection order and criminal complaint, as specific acts enumerated in I.C. § 18–6409 
or whether the phrase, in the context of the protection order, must be interpreted in a 
general, common language manner.”  Id.  Concluding that the phrase “disturbing the peace” 
referenced the definition of that phrase in I.C. § 18–6409, the court of appeals affirmed the 
district court.  Id. at 663-64, 365 P.3d at 419-20.  This closer reading shows that the only 
issue raised, and addressed, in the Pierce opinion was whether the phrase “disturb the 
peace” in the protection order incorporated the statutory definition of that phrase.  There 
was no argument or decision that Pierce’s act did not violate I.C. § 18–6409. 
 Even if the opinion could be read to mean that canceling electrical service to one’s 
house in which one’s ex-wife lives is not disturbing the peace, such provides little, if any, 
support for the district court’s analysis.  Nothing in Pierce says, or even hints, that the 
district court’s “exterior”/”internal” distinction is the proper interpretation of the disturbing 
the peace statute.  As noted above, a person’s peace includes “freedom from disquieting or 
oppressive thoughts or emotions” and “harmony in personal relations.”  It is unclear how 
electrical power is necessary for such freedom and harmony.  On the other hand, trying to 
get H.H. fired by sending her employers sexually graphic pictures of her certainly deprived 
her of freedom from disquieting or oppressive thoughts or emotions (H.H. testified she was 
“humiliated” and “annoyed” (R., p. 223)) and disrupted harmony in her personal relations 
(Lantis was trying to disrupt H.H.’s employment relationship (R., p. 223)). 
 The district court’s “exterior”/”internal” dichotomy is not supported by the plain 
language of the statute, the placement of the chapter in the Idaho Code, or the Pierce 
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decision.  Lantis disturbed H.H.’s peace by humiliating her and attempting to get her fired 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s appellate 
decision reversing Lantis’s conviction for disturbing the peace. 




        /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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